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Abstract
In 2003, Germany moved from a system in which participants in train-
ing programs for the unemployed are assigned by caseworkers to an alloca-
tion system using vouchers. Based on the rich administrative data for all
vouchers and on actual program participation, we provide inverse probabil-
ity weighting and ordinary least squares estimates of the employment and
earnings effects of a voucher award. Our results imply that after the award,
voucher recipients experience long periods of lower labor market success.
On average, there are only small positive employment effects and no gains
in earnings even four years after the voucher award. However, we do find
significantly positive effects both for low-skilled individuals and for degree
courses. The strong positive selection effects implied by our estimates are
consistent with sizeable cream-skimming effects.
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1 Introduction
Vocational training for the unemployed is an important part of active labor mar-
ket policy (ALMP) in many countries. Such programs aim at skill enhancement
to improve chances of participants in the labor market. In 2003, Germany moved
from a system in which participants are assigned to training programs by case-
workers to an allocation system using vouchers. Assigning government-funded
programs using vouchers allows recipients to choose among a set of eligible train-
ing providers. At the same time the local employment agency specifies the educa-
tional objective of the training program, for which the voucher can be redeemed.
During the years 2003 and 2004, caseworkers were urged to award a training
voucher only when it can be expected that the probability to find a job after
training participation is above 70%. Allowing more choice for the participants
should result in better choices, thus increasing the effectiveness of training (Pos-
ner et al. 2000). However, there is concern that the unemployed may not be
sufficiently informed to make good choices in using the training vouchers and
that concerns unrelated to the effectiveness of the program may drive the re-
demption decision. This paper estimates the employment and earnings effects
of a voucher award during the years 2003 and 2004. Using rich administrative
data, our estimates control for selection with respect to a large set of observable
characteristics.
The Adult and Dislocated Worker Program under the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) in the U.S. and the German Training Vouchers are two important
cases that use vouchers for the provision of training.1 In 2003, the German
government spent more than 6.5 billion euros for further training programs that
were allocated using vouchers. Training vouchers are awarded to the unemployed
by caseworkers, if they consider training to be helpful for finding a job. A voucher
recipient may choose a course offered by an eligible training provider, if the course
fits the training content and the planned duration specified by the voucher.
1Training vouchers are not only used in the context of ALMP but also to foster training of
employees (see Go¨rlitz, 2010, for a recent evaluation of such training vouchers in Germany).
Education vouchers are for the most part used in the schooling system (Posner et al. 2000) and
(Ladd, 2002, for a review of the literature on school vouchers).
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In the U.S., customers in the WIA program can use the fixed budget provided
by the government-funded Individual Training Accounts (ITA) to pay for partici-
pation in training. The choice is restricted to eligible training providers who offer
occupational skills in demand at the local labor market, but there is more choice
in the content of training compared to the German case. There exist several
studies on the ITA’s and preceding voucher-like programs involving descriptive
evidence, experimental evidence, or qualitative evaluations of the implementa-
tion (see Barnow, 2009, for an overview). In the 1970s, there was an experiment
on the use of training vouchers for needy parents. Participants were randomly
assigned to a group receiving counseling only, a group receiving counseling and
a 50% subsidy for the costs of basically any sort of training the participant was
able to enroll in, and a third group receiving counseling and a 100% subsidy.
Although the subsidy led to additional enrollment in training, no positive impact
on earnings was found (Barnow, 2009).
More recently, an experiment was conducted to study the relative effectiveness
of different levels of counseling and control by the caseworkers. One extreme case
would be to create a system in which caseworkers direct customers to a specific
course through counseling, award an ITA corresponding directly to a customer’s
need, and have the right to reject a customer’s choice. In a polar-opposite case,
caseworkers can award all customers with the same fixed amount for the ITA
and provide counseling upon request only. The majority of agencies use a system
somewhere in between these two extremes (Perez-Johnson et al. 2011). For the
experiment, individuals who were to receive an ITA under the WIA at one of seven
particular sites were randomly assigned to three different treatments regarding
the freedom of choice of the customer, the counseling requirements, and the award
structure (fixed or customized): “structured choice model”, “guided choice model”,
and “maximum choice model”. With regard to long-term labor market outcomes,
it turned out that participants of all three groups are equally likely to be employed
six to eight years after the experiment, but those who were in the ”structured
choice” group have the highest earnings. Their earnings are significantly higher
than those of the ”guided choice” group, while the earnings of the ”maximum
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choice group” lie in between (Perez-Johnson et al. 2011).
Heinrich et al. (2013) provide a large scale econometric evaluation of the ser-
vices provided by the Adult and Dislocated Worker Program under the WIA.
Participants receive basic job search assistance and part of them receive inten-
sive counseling or short training courses and some are awarded an ITA for a
training program of an external provider. Heinrich et al. (2013) provide separate
estimation results for participants in the Adult programs (targeted to individu-
als with poor work histories) and participants in the Dislocated Worker programs
(targeted to individuals who have been laid off). In their main analysis, they esti-
mate the effects of participating in WIA (regardless of the services that are taken)
as opposed to not entering WIA. They find large positive employment and earn-
ings effects for the Adult program and find positive employment effects, though
only small and insignificant earnings effects, for the Dislocated Worker program.
Heinrich et al. (2013) also estimate the effects of receiving training through an
ITA as opposed to receiving only the other services of the WIA (and possibly
training not related to the WIA program), but advise the reader to interpret the
results with some caution. For the Adult program, the long-run earnings effects
are large, and there are also positive long-run employment effects. The authors
find no positive effects for the Dislocated Worker program in their observation
period of four years. Heinrich et al. (2013) estimate the effect of participating in
training assigned through an ITA and do not estimate the effect of being awarded
with an ITA. In the U.S., this difference may not be important, but it is impor-
tant in Germany because a considerable number of those receiving a voucher do
not participate in training and the timing may be important as described below.
Rinne et al. (2013) estimate the effects of actual participation in training un-
der the voucher system in Germany. Using a dynamic matching approach, the
study finds positive effects of training participation after the reform in 2003 on
employment and earnings 1.5 years after the program start. Rinne et al. (2013) do
not observe the award of vouchers itself but program participation spells. They do
not evaluate the treatment“voucher award”but the treatment“training participa-
tion”. With the latter approach, first, individuals not redeeming a voucher are in
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the control group and, second, the treatment start and thus also the alignment of
participants and control persons occurs in the month in which the treatment starts
and not in the month in which the voucher is awarded. Evaluating the treatment
“training participation” requires different assumptions to identify a causal effect
from those for evaluating the treatment “voucher award”. In the former case, the
researcher must account for the dynamic selection both for the voucher award
and actual participation, while in the latter case only the selection of receiving a
training voucher must be accounted for. Moreover, in the former case, the fact
that potential participants have already been awarded a voucher when they sign
up for training and finally start the program may call into question the assump-
tion that individuals cannot perfectly anticipate the time of treatment (here: the
start of the training spell) typically invoked when applying a dynamic matching
approach.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate the effect
of being awarded with a voucher for participation in a training program as an
intention-to-treat effect.2 From a policy perspective, it is the effect of the voucher
award that is of prime interest, because this is the policy intervention. The case-
worker decides upon the voucher award but cannot perfectly control the actual
participation in training. This holds in particular because as part of the 2003 re-
form, caseworkers were not supposed to sanction an unemployed individual for not
redeeming a voucher. We apply a matching strategy, which accounts for selection
based on observable characteristics. To avoid the bias that is inevitable if a static
evaluation approach is used in a dynamic setting (Frederiksson and Johansson,
2008), we follow Sianesi (2004) and estimate the effects of starting treatment now
versus not starting treatment now for each month of elapsed unemployment. The
alternative of not starting treatment now entails the possibility that treatment
starts in the future. This evaluation approach aligns treated individuals and con-
trols by the elapsed unemployment duration, and it only compares individuals
2There is a large literature estimating the effects of public sponsored training for the unemployed
in Germany (see Biewen et al. 2014, Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006), Lechner, Miquel, and
Wunsch (2011, 2007), and Rinne et al. 2013). With the exception of the last study, the literature
analyzes the time period before the introduction of the voucher system. The evidence on
employment and earnings effects of further training is mixed; see Card, Kluve, and Weber
(2010) for a recent review.
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who are still unemployed at the time of the treatment start. The approach is
implemented using both inverse probability weighting (IPW) and ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions. As a sensitivity analysis, we also implement an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach exploiting the unexplained variation in differences
in policy styles across regional employment agencies.
Our study uses unique rich administrative data provided by the Federal Em-
ployment Agency in Germany. We have information on all individuals who re-
ceived training vouchers in 2003 or 2004 and on a 3% sample of all other unem-
ployed. Our data allow us to follow individuals for four years after the voucher
award. The data include precise award dates and redemption dates for the vouch-
ers. This information has not been previously available for evaluation studies.
We merge the voucher data with individual data records from the Integrated
Employment Biographies (IEB), which contains information on employment out-
comes and a rich set of control variables, e.g., the complete employment and
welfare history, various socioeconomic characteristics, information on health and
disabilities, and regional labor market characteristics.
Our results imply that the award of a training voucher has strong and lasting
negative lock-in effects. Lock-in effects of training programs can be explained by
a lower job search intensity during program participation, and training programs
in Germany may even last more than two years. It is four years after the voucher
award that small, significantly positive employment effects are found. There are
no positive effects on earnings during the observation period. OLS and IPW
lead to virtually the same results. A comparison of raw differences between
the treatment and control group indicates a strong positive selection of voucher
recipients with respect to observable characteristics. In our sensitivity analysis,
the monthly IV estimates are quite imprecise. However, at an annual frequency,
the IV estimates prove more precise, and they do not differ significantly from the
OLS estimates.
Allowing for effect heterogeneity identifies subgroups for which a voucher
award is more effective. The employment and earnings effects are more posi-
tive for individuals without a vocational degree and for programs leading to a
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vocational degree. A decomposition of the effect estimates reveals that those un-
employed who do not redeem the voucher do better than comparable individuals
who are not awarded with a voucher in the short run, but they do much worse in
the long run. This suggests that any positive effect of a voucher award actually
works through participation in training.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a
brief overview of the institutional background, followed by the data description.
Section 4 discusses identification and estimation. We present our results on the
average voucher effect and effect heterogeneity in Section 5. The final section
concludes.
2 Background
Before 2003, vocational training for the unemployed in Germany involved the di-
rect assignment by caseworkers of the unemployed to a specific training provider
and training course. At the time, the political debate addressed the concern that
vocational training was not effective and that this might have been related to the
close relationships between local employment agencies and training providers.
The First Modern Services on the Labor Market Act (the so-called Hartz I Re-
form) introduced a voucher system for the provision of training for the unem-
ployed in January 2003. Its aim is to foster market mechanisms and transparency
in the training market.3
During an unemployment spell, individuals repeatedly meet their caseworker
for counseling. In the profiling process, the caseworker reviews their potential
labor market opportunities. If there is a lack of necessary qualifications to be
integrated into employment immediately, participation in a training course is
considered necessary. The caseworker denotes the objective, content, and maxi-
mum duration of the course on the voucher. The unemployed individual may then
choose a course offered by an eligible training provider that is located within a
one-day commuting zone subject to the restrictions denoted on the voucher.4 It is
3For more details on the reform, see Schneider et al. (2007).
4The one-day commuting zone is defined as a regional zone that can be reached by public
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thus the task of the caseworker (potentially in discussion with the unemployed in-
dividual) to decide upon the training objective and the educational content of the
course. The unemployed individual may choose the provider and the particular
course. Eligible (certified) training providers are listed in an online tool provided
by the employment agency, and providers may also advertise their courses, e.g.,
by placing handouts in the employment agency.5 The caseworker is not allowed
to give any advice as to the choice of provider, which is a response to the con-
cern that the relationships between the local employment agencies and training
providers were excessively close before 2003. Training vouchers are valid for at
most three months, so training has to start within this period.
The German voucher system differs from the WIA system in the U.S. with
regard to who makes which decision. WIA customers face two main restrictions:
The content of the course must relate to an occupation in demand on the local
labor market (which is defined by the local agency), and similar to the German
case, the training provider must be listed as an eligible provider. The choice of the
content of the training is left to the customer. However, the customer typically
has to undergo counseling, which involves an assessment of skills, research on the
training programs and the labor market, and face-to-face discussions with the
caseworker about the course to choose (McConnell et al. 2011, King and Barnow
2011). In contrast to the German case, WIA customers in the U.S. receive guid-
ance on how to use the voucher but may finally make the decision regarding the
content of the training. Thus, after a guided and mandatory decision process, the
voucher recipient may decide, for example, to enroll in training to become an IT
specialist instead of a care nurse. In Germany, the voucher recipient may state his
preference (for example, to become an IT specialist) before the voucher award,
but ultimately, the caseworker decides upon the content of the training. Then,
after the award of the voucher, the German unemployed individual receives no
guidance by the caseworker regarding the choice of training course. Thus, com-
transport in a reasonable amount of time. For a training course with six or more hours a day,
commuting times of up to 2.5 hours are reasonable. For a training course with less than six
hours a day, the reasonable commuting time is reduced to two hours.
5In 2003 and 2004, the Federal Employment Agency was in charge of the certification of the
eligible training providers. Afterwards, the certification process was privatized.
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pared to the old system, the German voucher does not introduce more freedom of
choice with regard to the contents to be studied. However, it nevertheless repre-
sents an important change because it allows the unemployed to choose a provider
and also to decide not to redeem the voucher. Previously, the unemployed basi-
cally received a letter notifying them that they had to present themselves for a
training program at a certain date and a certain place. The new system allows
for some choice, and for the first time, it treats the unemployed as clients who
are eligible for a costly service that may also make a difference for them.
Vocational training programs are used to adjust the skills of the unemployed to
the changing requirements of the labor market and possibly to change the condi-
tions of the employability of the individual (due to health problems, for example).
Their goal is to improve the human capital and productivity of the participants.
Participation prolongs the entitlement period for unemployment benefits.6 Fur-
ther training mainly comprises long-term training and degree courses. Long-term
training courses typically last several months to one year (in our sample, an aver-
age of five months) and usually involve full-time programs. Teaching takes place
in class rooms or on the job in training firms. The course curriculum may also in-
clude internships. Typical examples of training schemes are courses on IT-based
accounting or on customer orientation and the sales approach. With a typical
duration of two to three years, degree courses (similar to the former retraining
programs) last much longer and lead to a full new vocational degree within the
German apprenticeship system. Thus, they cover, for example, the full curricu-
lum of the vocational training for care-assistance for the elderly or for an office
clerk. Although the Federal Employment Agency typically covers the costs for at
most two years, these programs may last for three years and other programs exist
(e.g., those sponsored directly by the state government) that cover the additional
costs.
In addition to the opportunity to take part in an intensive training program,
training vouchers may influence future labor market opportunities through vari-
ous channels (see, for example, Barnow, 2000, 2009, Hipp and Warner, 2008, for
6The duration of unemployment benefits varies between 12 and 36 months depending on previous
employment and age.
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a discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of using vouchers for
the allocation of further training programs). Training vouchers are expected to
improve the self-responsibility of the training participants and should introduce
market mechanisms into the provision of training. The first main difference with
the old system is that the voucher recipients have a choice with regard to the
course and the provider. This is expected to change the behavior of the train-
ing providers and the selection of those providers that participate in the market.
Voucher recipients have the freedom to choose the training provider and the par-
ticular program, which should lead to efficient outcomes if they know their needs
best. However, it may be the case that experienced caseworkers have a better un-
derstanding of the training providers that offer the best programs and the courses
that are the most suitable for a particular unemployed individual. Furthermore,
the choice on the part of the unemployed individual may be driven by concerns
unrelated to the effectiveness of the training program, and some individuals may
feel incapable of finding a suitable course, which may have negative effects on mo-
tivation. The increased course choices may have a positive effect on the provider
side. One would expect that competition for potential clients will have a posi-
tive effect on the selection of providers remaining on the market in addition to
strengthening the efficiency on their part. To ensure that training providers offer
courses that are in line with the regional labor demand, the local employment
agencies have to plan and publish their regional and sector-specific demand once
a year.7
A second difference with the old system is that the caseworker does not im-
pose a sanction when a voucher is not redeemed and the unemployed individual
provides a reasonable explanation. After redemption, however, training partic-
ipation is mandatory. The freedom not to redeem the voucher may change the
attitude of the unemployed individual toward this service; the voucher may be
perceived as being more like an offer and less like an assignment. This could
exert a positive attitude effect such that the unemployed individual may value
the fact that a costly service is being offered to him or her and may reciprocate
7This is similar to the WIA, stipulating that the local agency provides a list of occupations in
demand at the local level.
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by increasing the search effort or by participating wholeheartedly in the training
program.
Together with the voucher system, the labor market reform in 2003 introduced
a new assignment criterion for the award of a voucher. According to predictions,
the caseworkers in local employment agencies are supposed to award vouchers
such that at least 70% of the voucher recipients find a job within six months after
training ends.8
3 Data Description
This study is based on unique data provided by the Federal Employment Agency
of Germany. These data contain information on all individuals in Germany who
received a training voucher in 2003 or 2004. The data are generated from in-
ternal administrative data and include precise award and redemption dates for
each voucher - information that previously has not been available for evaluation
purposes.
For each voucher recipient, we merge the information on training vouchers to
the individual’s data record in the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB).9
The data contain detailed daily information on employment subject to social
security contributions, receipt of transfer payments during unemployment, job
search, and participation in different active labor market programs as well as rich
individual information.10 Thus, we are able to enrich the information from the
voucher data with a large set of personal characteristics and a long labor market
history for all voucher recipients.
8Because this prediction was always made intuitively by the caseworker, the real integration rate
never reached this level. The 70% rule was abolished after the time period considered here.
9The IEB is a rich administrative data base that is the source of the subsamples of data used in
all recent-year studies evaluating German ALMP. It is a merged data file containing individual
data records collected in four different administrative processes: the IAB Employment History
(Bescha¨ftigten-Historik), the IAB Benefit Recipient History (Leistungsempfa¨nger-Historik), the
Data on Job Search originating from the Applicants Pool Database (Bewerberangebot), and the
Participants-in-Measures Data (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank).
10A more detailed description of the IEB in English can be found on the website of the Research
Data Center of the Federal Employment Agency (http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx). The version of the
IEB we use in this project has been supplemented with some personal and regional information
not available in the standard version.
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Our control persons are from the same data base: A 3% random sample
(based on twelve days of birth during the year) of those individuals in Germany
who experience at least one switch from employment to non-employment (of at
least one month) between 1999 and 2005 has been drawn. When constructing our
sample of analysis, we apply the same selection rules for voucher recipients and
control persons. We account for the fact that we use a 100% sample of voucher
recipients and a 3% sample of non-recipients by using weights in all tables and
estimations.
We consider an inflow sample into unemployment consisting of individuals
who became unemployed in 2003, after having been continuously employed for
at least three months. Entering unemployment is defined as the transition from
(non-subsidized, non-marginal) employment to non-employment of at least one
month plus a subsequent (not necessarily immediate) contact with the employ-
ment agency, either through benefit receipt, program participation, or a job search
spell.11 We only consider unemployed individuals who are eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits.12 This sample choice reflects the main target group for the training
vouchers. To exclude individuals eligible for specific labor market programs tar-
geted to youths and individuals eligible for early retirement schemes, we only
consider persons aged between 25 and 54 years at the beginning of their unem-
ployment spell.
We aggregate the spell information in the original data into calendar months.
We follow a person in the sample from the month of his or her first inflow into
unemployment until the end of 2004 with regard to the voucher award and until
the end of 2008 with regard to the employment outcome. We do not consider
individuals who receive a training voucher after December 2004 because the next
step of the labor market reforms also affecting training was implemented in Jan-
uary 2005. Information from prior periods is exploited when constructing the
covariates referring to the labor market history. The focus is on the first voucher
11Subsidized employment refers to employment in the context of an ALMP. Marginal employ-
ment refers to employment of a few hours per week only; this is due to specific social security
regulations in Germany.
12Note that, in particular, this condition excludes training programs for mothers returning to the
labor market after longer employment interruptions.
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awarded. We distinguish the two outcome states non-subsidized, non-marginal
employment (henceforth denoted as employment) and non-employment as alter-
native states. As an alternative outcome variable, we use monthly earnings. The
panel data set for the analysis is completed by adding personal, occupational, and
regional information. Covariates on individual characteristics refer to the time
of inflow into unemployment, whereas covariates on regional characteristics are
updated each month.
The final sample includes 133,193 unweighted observations, of which 50,796
individuals are awarded with a voucher during their first twelve months of un-
employment and 82,397 observations are in the control group. There are 42,331
individuals in our sample who redeem their vouchers. This amounts to a re-
demption rate of 83%. We observe 8,465 vouchers that are awarded but not
redeemed.13
Tables 1 to 4 report the mean values for the most important socioeconomic and
labor market characteristics of the individuals in the evaluation sample. In the
first two columns of each table, we display the mean value of the respective control
variable in the treatment and in the control subsample. In columns six and seven,
we distinguish between those who redeem the voucher and those who do not.
Voucher recipients are on average more often middle-aged, single or single-parent
and females than the individuals in the control group. They exhibit fewer health
problems. Individuals who redeem the training voucher and thus participate in a
training course are on average slightly older and healthier than individuals who
do not redeem their voucher. In addition, the fraction of individuals with children
living in the same household is somewhat higher, and the children are on average
older than the children of individuals not redeeming a voucher.
Voucher recipients hold a higher schooling degree on average. Furthermore,
they tend to have more successful employment histories in the previous 7 years,
and in particular, they had higher earnings. The share of individuals with stable
employment and no participation in an active labor market program in the past
is remarkably higher in the treatment group, already suggesting a strong positive
13These individuals would be in the control group if we used the sample design of Rinne et al.
(2013).
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selection of the treated. We have also information about potential placement
handicaps of the unemployed, e.g., indirect information about past psycho-social
or drug problems, lack of motivation, received sanction from the caseworker or
past incapacities due to illness, pregnancy or child care. Those receiving a training
voucher are less likely to exhibit problems of this type. The fraction of people
with motivation deficits or past incapacities is even lower for individuals who
redeem the voucher.
4 Identification and Estimation
Our analysis will rely on a dynamic selection-on-observables identification strat-
egy, which is motivated by the richness of our administrative data. As a sensitivity
analysis, we investigate the robustness of the main results by providing instru-
mental variable (IV) estimates, which exploit the unexplained variation in policy
styles across regional employment agencies.
We consider voucher awards during the first twelve months of unemployment
in the first unemployment spell between January 2003 and December 2004. Each
unemployed individual is observed for at least 48 months. The indicator for a
voucher award as an intention to treat is denoted by Dim ∈ {0, 1} (with individ-
uals i = 1, ..., N and m = 1, ..., 12 indicating the elapsed unemployment duration
at the time when the voucher is awarded in months). The outcome variable is
denoted by Yimt (where t = 1, ..., 48 indicates the number of months since the
award of the voucher). We consider employment and monthly earnings as out-
come variables, and we estimate the effect of the voucher award (not the actual
training participation). To avoid the bias that is inevitable if a static evaluation
approach is used in a dynamic setting (Frederiksson and Johansson, 2008), we
follow Sianesi (2004) and estimate the effect of treatment start versus no treat-
ment start (treatment versus waiting) for each month of elapsed unemployment
duration. The treatment is the award of a voucher, i.e., the intention to assign
further training. In the results section, we report a weighted average of the twelve
monthly dynamic treatment effects (see Appendix A for details).
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The potential outcomes are indicated by Y dimt, where d = 1 under treatment
and 0 otherwise. For each individual unemployed until month m, only the realized
outcome Yimt = Y
1
imt ·Dim +Y 0imt · (1−Dim). Our goal is to estimate the expected
difference between the outcomes Y 0imt and Y
1
imt for treated individuals
γmt = E[Y
1
imt|Dim = 1]− E[Y 0imt|Dim = 1].
Hence, E[Y 1imt|Dim = 1] is identified from observed data. In contrast, E[Y 0imt|Dim =
1] involves the expected counterfactual non-treatment outcome for treated indi-
viduals. To identify this parameter, we need to make further assumptions.
4.1 Identification Strategy
Assuming that there is only selection on observables, it is possible to control
for all confounding variables that jointly influence the treatment probability and
the potential non-treatment outcome, summarized by the vector of pre-treatment
variables Xim. This is formalized by the following dynamic version of the condi-
tional mean independence assumption.
Assumption 1 (Strong Ignorability).
i) Dynamic mean independence assumption (DMIA):
E[Y 0imt|Dim = 1, Xim = x] = E[Y 0imt|Dim = 0, Xim = x] and
ii) Common support: p(x) < 1, where p(x) = Pr(Dim = 1|Xim = x)
hold jointly for all m = 1, ..., 12 and t = 1, ..., 48.
The DMIA states that conditional on a given unemployment experience and
a vector of observed covariates, the sequence of potential outcomes associated
with not receiving the treatment in a particular month is mean independent of
the treatment status in this month. In a dynamic context, not receiving the
treatment in the current month entails the possibility of participation in later
months. Our matching approach will produce valid estimates if we consider all
the determinants that jointly influence treatment status (i.e., voucher award) and
potential outcomes. Conditional on these determinants, individuals are randomly
allocated to receiving a voucher or not in a given month, and the treated and non-
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treated have the same predictions of future treatment or employment chances. We
argue in the following that these assumptions are plausible in light of a voucher
assignment in Germany and the rich information in our data.
The literature (e.g., Heckman et al. (1999) and Mueser et al. (2007) with
regard to US programs and Biewen et al. (2014) and Lechner and Wunsch (2013)
with regard to German training programs) stresses the importance of conditioning
flexibly on lagged employment and wages, benefit receipt history, basic personal
characteristics and local labor market characteristics. These pieces of information
are all available in our data, and we use them in a flexible way. The literature ad-
dresses the plausibility of the conditional independence assumption (CIA, which
is the static counterpart of DMIA) with regard to directly assigning a training
program, but we believe that the award of a voucher to be used for a training
program involves a similar selection process, which is perhaps less demanding
with regard to the CIA because the actual start of the program is not part of this
selection. Although training participation was mandatory under the old system
in Germany, there may have been individuals who have talked the caseworker
into not assigning a program or who have not started it even though they had
to. Such cases are demanding for the CIA and do not have to be accounted for
in our case. Our data allows us to control for the full labor market history of
the previous seven years and on important local labor market characteristics. In
their sensitivity analysis, Biewen et al. (2014) find that it is very important to
exactly match on the elapsed unemployment duration in months. This is im-
plemented in the present paper by the dynamic approach. Note that the award
of a voucher is left to the discretion of the caseworker; thus, from the perspec-
tive of the unemployed, the receipt of a voucher cannot be perfectly anticipated.
Moreover, the data involves pieces of information that are collected by the case-
worker as a basis for his counseling activities and assignment decisions (see also
Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Paul (2014)). To be specific, we consider
the following variables that reflect part of the caseworker’s information on the mo-
tivation, plans and labor market prospects of a particular unemployed individual:
the caseworker’s assessment of the job-seeker’s current health status, information
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on his/her previous health status (during the previous 6 years before the start
of the current unemployment spell), a dummy variable indicating whether the
unemployed person appeared to lack motivation (e.g., failed to attend regular
meetings), dummies indicating whether the job-seeker dropped out of a program,
whether benefits were withdrawn, and whether the person participated in a pro-
gram providing psychosocial support, where all variables refer to the previous 3
years unless stated otherwise. In addition, we include the employment and wel-
fare history as sequences of the previous 7 years before the start of the current
unemployment spell and variables indicating whether the job-seeker is looking for
a part-time job.
The common support assumption ii) requires that it is possible in large sam-
ples to identify for each treated observation some comparable non-treated com-
parison observations. We apply some simple support tests but are not concerned
about the failure of this assumption (see discussion in Lechner and Strittmatter,
2014). Given Assumption 1,
E[Y 0imt|Dim = 1] = E
[
(1−Dim) · p(Xim)
Pr(Dim = 1) · (1− p(Xim)) · Yimt
]
,
is identified from the observed data on {Yimt, Dim, Xim} (Hirano, Imbens, and
Ridder, 2003). For estimation, we use inverse probability weighting (IPW) and
ordinary least squares (OLS). For both approaches, we perform exact matching
on the elapsed unemployment duration and the duration since the award of the
voucher. Thus, we align treated individuals and controls by the elapsed unem-
ployment duration, and we only compare individuals who are still unemployed
at the time of the treatment start. Taking IPW as a benchmark, we specify our
parametric OLS regressions to allow for sufficient flexibility.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
Asymptotic theory suggests that IPW has some efficiency advantage in compar-
ison to classical matching estimators in large samples (Heckman, Ichimura, and
Todd, 1997, Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2003). Moreover, recent simulation
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studies support this result (Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary, 2009). Concerning
the reweighting technique, we follow the suggestions of Busso, DiNardo, and Mc-
Crary (2009) and use weights that sum up to one as a small sample correction.
The average effect for the treated is estimated by
γˆmt =
N∑
i=1
Dim
N∑
i=1
Dim
· Yimt −
N∑
i=1
(1−Dim) · pˆ(Ximt)
1− pˆ(Ximt)
N∑
i=1
(1−Dim) · pˆ(Ximt)
1− pˆ(Ximt)
· Yimt,
where t = 1, ..., 48 indicates the time after treatment and m = 1, ..., 12 indicates
the elapsed unemployment duration until treatment. The propensity score p(Xim)
is specified as a probit model. We perform different balancing tests to ensure
that the treated and non-treated are well matched with respect to observable
characteristics (see Appendix B for details).
Although IPW has some optimality properties, some critical issues may arise.
First, the IPW estimators for the average treatment effect for the treated may
exhibit fat tails when the treatment probability is close to one. However, the treat-
ment probability in our application is far below one. Second, the implementation
of the IPW estimator relies on the estimation of an appropriate specification for
the treatment probability (we rely on probit estimates). To demonstrate that
our results are robust and not driven by specific issues with one estimator, we
contrast the IPW estimates with the estimates obtained by a very flexible OLS
regression. Although the implicit parametric assumptions may not hold, OLS
might provide a good estimate of the average treatment effects.14 Because nearly
all of the control variables in this study are binary (excluding the earnings history
and regional characteristics), our model is very flexible. We find that OLS leads
to qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results to those of IPW. Using the
same specification as the OLS outcome regressions, we implement an IV approach
as a sensitivity analysis (see Appendix C for details). In addition, the IV esti-
14Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest that OLS results often do not differ substantially from
results obtained by more demanding non-parametric or semi-parametric estimators in many
cases. In particular, they emphasize that the OLS finds exactly the conditional expectation
function in fully saturated models, thus providing the non-parametric estimates for such a case.
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mates do not differ significantly from the OLS estimates. Therefore, our detailed
analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects will rely on the OLS estimates.
5 Results
We first discuss the OLS and IPW estimates of the average treatment effects for
the treated. Then, we investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment effects across
skill groups and across the type of training programs based on the OLS estimates.
Finally, we decompose the effect estimates by whether the treated actually redeem
the training voucher. Inference is based on a bootstrap clustering at the individual
level, thus resampling all observations over time for an individual. Calculating
all estimates based on the same resample allows us to test for differences between
different estimators.
5.1 Average Treatment Effects for the Treated
5.1.1 Baseline Results
This section discusses the estimated average effects of a voucher award on em-
ployment and earnings based on OLS and IPW. We provide graphical evidence on
the descriptive average differences between the treated and the non-treated and
on the estimated average treatment effects for the treated. As explained above,
we estimate separately the effect of treatment versus waiting for each of the first
twelve months of elapsed unemployment durations. We only report the average
over these twelve months (further month-specific results are available upon re-
quest). On the time axis, we depict the months since the voucher receipt, and
on the vertical axis, the outcome variable is depicted. Diamonds indicate a sig-
nificant effect for the corresponding month. In each figure, the results for the
employment (earnings) outcome are placed to the left (right).
Figure 1 depicts the descriptive (unconditional) differences between the treated
and nontreated (top line) together with the average treatment effects based on
different estimators (OLS and IPW). The OLS and IPW results imply a very
long and pronounced lock-in effect. It takes approximately 40 months until the
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negative effect reaches zero for the employment and even longer for earnings; the
lock-in effect is much longer than what is typically found in studies for Germany
(see, e.g., Biewen et al. 2014 or Rinne et al. 2013). However, these studies restrict
their sample to participants in long-term training and do not consider the much
longer degree courses, and the treatment start is defined by the actual start of the
training program. Only at the end of our observation period of four years after
the award of the voucher, the OLS results imply a very small positive and signifi-
cant treatment effect (approximately 1-2 percentage points - henceforth, ppoints)
for employment. The effect for earnings remains negative even 48 months after
the treatment. The results obtained from using IPW are basically the same as
those obtained using OLS. This finding suggests that we use sufficient flexibility
in our specification of the OLS regression.
Figure 1 indicates that there are strong changes in the slopes of the treatment
effect at approximately 12 to 14, 24 to 26, and 36 to 38 months. This finding
can be explained by the fact that many programs have a duration of 12, 24 or
36 months and that the majority of treated individuals enter training within the
first two months after receiving the voucher (see, Figure 2). Figure 3 displays the
average employment and average earnings for treated individuals under treatment
and under non-treatment (using the weights of the IPW estimation). Employ-
ment under non-treatment is higher than under treatment for the first 3 years
after treatment. It takes 40 months after treatment until the employment effect
becomes positive.
The descriptive effect in Figure 1 involves a shorter and less pronounced lock-
in effect than that of the OLS estimates. This suggests positive selection based
on observables both for employment and earnings. As discussed in Section 3, the
treated are clearly a positive selection of the unemployed with regard to their labor
market chances. Their labor market history is better, with less unemployment
experience and higher earnings in the past; they hold higher schooling degrees,
suffer less from health problems and less sanctions and are less likely to have
dropped out of programs. This positive selection corresponds to the requirement
of awarding vouchers only to those unemployed individuals who are expected
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to have at least a 70% chance of entering employment soon after the program.
The control group for the descriptive effect has average characteristics and will
thus have a lower employment rate than the matched control group (see column
4 in Tables 1 to 4 for the average characteristics of the matched control group).
Because the treated are unemployed individuals with relatively good labor market
chances, many of them would have found a job in the short or medium run, if
they had not been treated.
As a robustness check, we investigate the sensitivity of our OLS results with
respect to selection on unobservables using an IV approach (Appendix C describes
the details of the sensitivity analysis). To construct an instrument for the voucher
award, we use the remaining variation after having controlled for a large set of
individual and regional characteristics. These controls account for individual
and regional differences in labor market conditions, which are likely to affect
the outcome variables directly.15 We interpret the remaining regional variation
as differences in regional policy style, which can be explained by preferences
and sentiments regarding the use of training vouchers. Although the instrument
used is highly significant (see Appendix C, Table 6), the IV effect estimates at
the monthly frequency are quite imprecisely estimated, and often not significant
(these results are not reported in the paper and they are available upon request).
To gain precision, we consider average effects by the year since the voucher award
(Table 7 in Appendix C). The yearly IV employment (earnings) effects are much
more precisely estimated, and they prove to be significantly negative during the
first three (two) years. The difference between the yearly IV estimates and yearly
OLS estimates is negative for all four years, although never significantly so. In
addition, the joint test of equality between OLS and IV (reported at the bottom
of Table 7 in Appendix C) during years 1 to 4 and during years 2 to 4 never
exhibits significant differences. Thus, although the IV point estimates suggest
positive selection on unobservables (i.e., OLS would be upward biased), there are
15Regional policy variation in the treatment intensity has been used by a number of studies
evaluating labor market policies. For example, Fro¨lich and Lechner (2010) exploit regional
variation for the evaluation of Swiss ALMP; Markussen and Roed (2014) use regional variation
to construct an instrument for participation in vocational rehabilitation programs in Denmark;
and Rehwald, Rosholm, and Rouland (2013) instrument participation in activation measures
for sick-listed workers in Norway.
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no significant differences between the OLS and the IV estimates. Therefore, our
interpretation of the empirical results and our detailed analysis of heterogeneous
treatment effects will rely on the OLS estimates.
In sum, the results so far imply that a voucher award leads to a strong and
very long negative lock-in effect. It takes four years after the voucher award
to find small, significantly positive employment effects. There are no positive
effects on earnings within the observation period. Different estimators (OLS and
IPW) based on a selection on observables assumptions basically provide the same
results, and the OLS estimates do not differ significantly from our IV estimates.
Raw employment differences indicate that with regard to observables, voucher
recipients represent a strong positive selection with respect to both outcomes
(for example, voucher recipients are less likely to be older than 50, and they have
earned higher wages in their previous jobs). Altogether, our findings are consistent
with cream-skimming by the caseworkers. This seems undesirable because many
of the voucher recipients would have found a job much sooner anyway, if they
had not received a voucher, and there are no sufficient average positive long-term
effects over the course of four years to compensate for the lock-in period.
5.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Skill Level
The mostly negative average treatment effects reported so far may hide hetero-
geneous treatment effects, which for some subgroups may even be significantly
positive. Now, we investigate the differences in effect estimates by skill level. We
focus on the OLS results, and additionally, we refer to the descriptive differences.
We first investigate effect heterogeneity by vocational degree.16 One may be con-
cerned that low-skilled individuals may not cope well with a voucher award. They
may not find the best training provider, they may not redeem the voucher, or they
may be more easily discouraged during participation. However, they may gain
significantly by a major investment in their human capital and by obtaining a
course certificate or even a vocational degree. Of the treated in our sample, 22%
16We have also looked into effect heterogeneity by gender. The effects of the voucher are quite
similar for men and women. If at all, women face a little less deep lock-in effect, and the effect
estimates are slightly more positive at the end of the observation period.
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do not hold a vocational degree (low-skilled individuals). Of the treated, 11%
are high-skilled, holding an academic degree. The majority of the treated hold a
vocational degree (medium-skilled). The top line in Figure 4 depicts the effect of
a voucher award for the group of those without a vocational degree. The lock-in
effects last for approximately three years (this is one year shorter than for the
whole sample), and four years after the award of the voucher, we find a significant
positive employment effect of nearly 6 ppoints and a significant positive earnings
effect of approximately 160 euro. In contrast, the effect for the high-skilled is
strongly negative over the whole observation period, and there is also no positive
effect for the medium-skilled.
Can we say more on why only low-skilled individuals benefit on average? A
potential explanation would be that the low-skilled have a shorter lock-in effect
because they had a lower probability to redeem the voucher. In our sample,
this is not the case: 21.8% of those individuals who redeem the voucher hold
no vocational degree, and the share is approximately the same (22.1%) among
those who do not redeem the voucher. Furthermore, the average time spent in
a training program (conditional on redeeming the voucher) is 14 months for the
low-skilled and 10 for the high-skilled. Thus, shorter courses or early dropout
do not explain a shorter lock-in period. Furthermore, from month 8 to month
24, the employment effects for the low-skilled are almost parallel to those of the
medium-skilled, with a stronger lock-in effect in the levels for the medium-skilled.
After month 25, the line for the low-skilled increases more rapidly. This is the
time at which the participants in the longer courses complete their courses and
search intensively for jobs. Note that low-skilled individuals participate more
often in degree courses (44% as opposed to 22% among the medium-skilled),
and participants in a degree course spend on average two years in their course.
Hence, participants in degree courses (after a quick redemption of the voucher)
re-enter the labor market with their new degree approximately 25 to 36 months
after the voucher award, and Figure 4 indicates the strongest increase for the
low-skilled during that time. These results suggest that the low-skilled voucher
recipients eventually do better in finding a job compared to the medium-skilled.
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Substantiating this finding, Figure 5 displays the employment rates of the treated
and matched controls by skill level. After 36 months, the treated low-skilled
exhibit nearly the same employment rate as the treated with a higher skill level.
In contrast, the matched low-skilled controls exhibit a much lower employment
rate than the matched controls for the two other skill levels.
The effect heterogeneity by skill level seems to be stronger under the voucher
system than under the old system in Germany, and the voucher award is more
effective for the low-skilled. This may be surprising, as one could fear that in par-
ticular, the low-skilled may be overstrained by finding a suitable program. Rinne
et al. (2011) and Biewen et al. (2014) find little evidence for effect heterogeneity
by skill level for long-term training in the pre-reform period.17 With regard to de-
gree programs, there exists relatively little prior evidence, because to look beyond
the lock-in effect of these very long programs, one needs an observation period of
at least three or four years. A series of studies using data from the 1990s are an
exception, as they have an extraordinarily long period to observe the labor market
outcomes of up to eight years. These studies find positive employment effects for
the long retraining program, which is closest to the degree courses investigated
in this paper (see Fitzenberger and Vo¨lter, 2007, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and
Vo¨lter, 2008, Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2007). In line with our findings,
Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011) estimate the largest positive effects for low-
skilled women without a vocational degree. For the U.S., Heinrich et al. (2013)
find more positive results for the WIA program for all services as well as for
training in particular under the Adult program than for the Dislocated Worker
program. Participants in the Adult program are more negatively selected than in
the Dislocated Worker program.
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Type of Training
In light of the above results, we now distinguish between the two types of training
programs: long-term training and degree courses (for the most part retraining).
17As one exception, Biewen et al. (2014) report a slightly more positive effect of long-term training
for low-skilled males who start their program in months 4 to 6 of the unemployment spell (see
the online appendix of Biewen et al. 2014).
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Because the type of program (length of the course and the objective of the course)
is specified by the voucher, we can treat the two alternatives as multiple exclusive
treatments. Here, we do not consider some very special programs or unredeemed
vouchers (for the latter, see the next section).
Tables 1 to 3 indicate that participants in degree courses are younger, more
likely to be female and unemployed, and earn lower wages in the recent past
than participants in long-term training. Degree courses have typically a very
long duration. It is thus not surprising that we find long and very deep lock-in
effects of more than 3 years, reducing the employment probability by nearly 36
ppoints and earnings by over 600 euro per month. However, after 48 months, the
employment effect is 8 ppoints, and earnings gains are relatively large with over
100 euro per month (Figure 9). Thus, degree courses involve high costs due to a
very long and deep lock-in period, but after three to four years, they considerably
increase the labor market chances. Considering long-term training programs,
we find a pronounced lock-in period of approximately 12 months. This lock-in
period is comparable to Rinne et al. (2013). However, after this pronounced lock-
in period, the estimated effects remain negative for the whole observation period
although the effect size is reduced over time. In contrast to our results, Rinne
et al. (2013) find a positive employment effect of approximately 7 ppoints at the
end of their observation period of 1.5 years after the program start. In Rinne et
al. (2013), those who do not redeem a voucher are members of the control group
and are likely to form good matches to control for selection. Furthermore, the
alignment between the treated and controls in Rinne et al. refers to the start of
participation in the training program, when a number of individuals who were
comparable at the time of the voucher award (among them, some of those who
did not redeem a voucher) may have found a job in the meantime and are thus
excluded from the control group. This may induce an upward bias in the effect
estimates.
Figures 10 and 11 compare the effect estimates for long-term training and
degree courses. Interestingly, the difference with the descriptive effect is a little
stronger for long-term courses than for degree courses (Figure 12), suggesting that
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the effect of cream-skimming is stronger for long-term training. Correspondingly,
a comparison of the characteristics of the control group to the treatment group of
the degree courses and to the treatment group of long-term training (the last two
columns in Table 1 to 3) also suggests that the positive selection on observables
is somewhat stronger for long-term training.
When discussing the results on effect heterogeneity by skill group, we have
suggested that the positive employment effects for the low-skilled may result
from those low-skilled who participate in degree courses. Table 2 confirms that
a higher share of participants in degree courses is low skilled (36.3%) than in
long-term training (15.6%). Furthermore, degree courses generally exhibit more
positive long-term effects than long-term training. Shedding further light on these
findings, Figure 13 distinguishes results by skill level and by type of training. In
degree courses, we find at least small positive employment effects for all skill
levels. We also find positive effects for the low-skilled in long-term training,
and the highest positive effect materializes for the low-skilled in degree courses.
Positive earnings effects can be found for the low-skilled participating in both
types of training and for the medium-skilled taking degree courses. Thus, degree
courses seem in general more effective than long-term training and the low-skilled
benefit in general from the award of a voucher. In contrast, awarding a voucher for
long-term training on average seems ineffective for the medium- and high-skilled.
5.4 Unredeemed Vouchers
The award of a voucher may have an effect by allowing the individual to partic-
ipate in a training program, but it may also have an effect on the labor market
outcomes themselves. Figures 14 to 16 display the effect estimates by the re-
demption decision. These OLS estimates do not allow for a causal interpretation
because the redemption decision itself is endogenous (see discussion above). Nev-
ertheless, these descriptive findings provide a statistical decomposition of the
average effect estimates.
Individuals who redeem their vouchers (at 83%, this is the majority among
the treated) exhibit the same pattern as for the effect for all treated. However,
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both the positive and the negative effect estimates are slightly more pronounced.
Individuals who do not redeem their voucher are first better off than the corre-
sponding control group of unemployed not being awarded with a voucher. This
positive effect may represent a threat effect because individuals may fear being
assigned to a mandatory active labor market program three months after the
voucher award, such as, for example, a job creation scheme. Note, however, that
individuals are not supposed to be sanctioned by a cut in unemployment benefits,
if they do not redeem a voucher. However, the positive effect may also be due to
those individuals who receive a job offer quickly and who therefore do not redeem
the voucher. This positive effect may be the result of higher motivation because
the award of a voucher may boost their attachment to the labor market and thus
increase their search effort. However, because not redeeming a voucher is not
sanctioned, some unemployed with a training voucher may just enjoy their unem-
ployment benefits for three months without being pushed to find a job (note that
these are not the ones who find a job quickly). For these individuals, employment
chances may have deteriorated over time.
After five months, the effect turns negative. Three potential reasons for this
are the following: First, those who do not redeem the voucher may participate
in other programs; second, the threat effect may lead to negative consequences
in the medium to long run (individuals may have taken unstable or unsuitable
jobs); and third, those who do not succeed in finding a training course may suffer
from a loss in motivation. Although we do not estimate the causal effects of
actual voucher redemption, the findings suggest that the average long run effects
of actual training participation are slightly better than the effects of a voucher
award.
6 Conclusions
This paper estimates the effect of the award of a training voucher on employment
and earnings for the unemployed in Germany. We use rich administrative data on
all training vouchers awarded in 2003 and 2004 and on participation in training
26
programs after the redemption of the voucher. We estimate the average effect of
a voucher award in a flexible way by OLS and by inverse probability weighting
(IPW) as alternatives to control for selection on observables.
Our results imply that the award of a training voucher on average has strong
and lasting negative lock-in effects. It takes four years after the voucher award to
find small, significantly positive employment effects. There are no positive effects
on earnings during the observation period. The two methods based on selection
on observables assumptions (IPW and OLS) lead to nearly the same results. The
OLS estimates do not differ significantly from our IV estimates, which we ob-
tained in a sensitivity analysis exploiting the unexplained variation in differences
in policy styles across regional employment offices. A comparison to raw em-
ployment differences indicates that with regard to observables, voucher recipients
represent a strong positive selection both regarding employment and earnings.
The strong positive selection effects implied by our estimates are consistent with
sizeable cream-skimming effects.
An investigation of effect heterogeneity by skill group and by type of training
indicates a more positive picture for some subgroups and a more negative one
for others: Individuals without a vocational degree are more successful in find-
ing a job after training than higher skilled individuals and the voucher leads to
considerable positive long-run effects. Despite strong and lasting lock-in effects,
programs leading to a vocational degree work better than those that do not. The
strongest positive effects are found for individuals without a vocational degree
participating in degree courses. Our study lacks a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis for these subgroups because the observation period is too short to assess
whether the positive effects found are sustained after our observation period. Fi-
nally, a statistical decomposition by the redemption decision suggests that those
treated, who do not redeem the voucher, do better in the short run but worse in
the long run than comparable individuals who do not receive a voucher.
Overall, the award of a voucher on average does not improve the labor market
perspectives of the voucher recipients. The disappointing result is that, even
though most recipients use the voucher to participate in training, they often are
27
not better in the long run, as if they had not been awarded with a voucher. At
the same time, they suffer from a lock-in effect that seems to be particularly
pronounced due to the strong positive selection of voucher recipients. There are
two exceptions to these overall negative findings: Voucher recipients who do not
hold a vocational degree and participants in degree courses benefit significantly
in the long run.
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A Averaging across Starting Dates
Following a dynamic treatment evaluation approach (Sianesi, 2004, Frederiksson
and Johansson, 2008), we estimate the effect of a voucher award versus waiting
for each of the first twelve months of the unemployment period m separately. In
the first month, the treatment group includes only individuals who are awarded
with a training voucher during the first month. Individuals who either receive
a voucher later or never are in the control group. In the second month, we
drop all individuals who have left the risk set in the first month, i.e., received
a voucher or found employment in the first month. The treatment group in the
second month consists of voucher recipients that are awarded with a voucher in
their second month of the unemployment period. Everybody in the risk set who
does not receive a voucher in the second month belongs to the control group. This
procedure continues until month twelve. By using this dynamic approach, we end
up with twelve different treatment effects for each of the twelve different times
of elapsed unemployment duration. To communicate our results, we reduce the
dimension of the results by reporting a weighted average of the twelve dynamic
treatment effects in the following. The weights are calculated as the fraction of
treated in the respective month of the total number of treated individuals
γˆt =
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
Dim · γˆmt
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
Dim
.
Given that we observe the labor market outcomes of each individual for 48 months
after treatment (t = 1, ..., 48), we specify a separate model for each month after
treatment. This induces flexibility in all parameters with respect to the duration
since treatment.
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B Matching Quality
We assess the matching quality by displaying the means of the matched control
group for different control variables in Tables 1-3. Further, we report the stan-
dardized differences before and after matching. The standardized differences are
defined as
SD =
X¯1 − X¯0√
0.5(σ2X1 + σ
2
X2
)
· 100,
where X¯d is the mean and σ
2
Xd
the variance in the respective treatment group
d ∈ {0, 1}. Before matching, we observe standardized differences larger than 40.
After matching, the standardized differences are always below one, suggesting a
very good matching quality.
We also apply a second balancing test following an approach of Smith and
Todd (2005). Therefore, we run the regression
xk = βˆ0 + βˆ1Dim + βˆ2pˆ(Xim) + βˆ3Dimpˆ(Xim) + εˆim,
where xk indicates the specific control variable. We perform a joint F-test for the
null hypothesis that βˆ1 and βˆ3 equal zero. In Table 5, we report the summarized
results of the test for each of the twelve treatment times. Overall, we run 1,272
regressions, of which the test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis in only 74
cases. We take the results of the assessment as an indication that the propensity
score is well balanced and acceptable for the performance of the IPW estimations.
Because we control directly for Xim in the OLS and IV regressions, it is not
necessary to assume that the propensity score is balanced for these estimators.
C Sensitivity Analysis: Instrumental Variable
Approach
As a robustness check, we apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach. In the
case of selection into treatment based on factors unobserved by the researcher,
an IV approach may provide consistent estimates of the treatment effects (for
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the subset of compliers in the random coefficients case). We use an IV approach
to assess the impact of selection on unobservables. If the results that we obtain
from the IV, OLS, and IPW approach do not differ significantly, we argue that
our OLS and IPW approaches control sufficiently for all confounding variables.
To construct an instrument for the voucher award, we exploit the variation
in the conditional regional-specific allocation intensity of training vouchers. Re-
gional policy variation in the treatment intensity has been used by a number
of studies evaluating labor market policies (see references in footnote 15). In
our case, the variation in the conditional employment district-specific allocation
intensity, which we name conditional regional policy style, can be explained by
preferences and sentiments regarding the use of training vouchers that differ across
employment offices. This preference is assumed to be independent of the regional
labor market characteristics after controlling for a large set of individual and
regional characteristics. The implicit assumption is that solely living in a re-
gion with a high or low allocation intensity, without receiving a voucher, has no
influence on the potential outcomes.
The number of vouchers awarded per unemployed varies across and within
employment offices. As an indication of the between variation, Figure 17 displays
the differences in unconditional award intensities across employment office dis-
tricts in Germany. In some areas of Germany, there exist large differences even
between neighboring districts. The employment offices themselves decide upon
how much of their budget is used for training vouchers and how much for alterna-
tive instruments of ALMP. Lechner, Wunsch, and Scioch (2013) argue that local
employment offices have a high degree of autonomy in defining the mix of ALMP
they are implementing, which partly depends on preferences that are unrelated
to the labor market. Furthermore, they decide upon the targeting of the training
vouchers. The differences in voucher award intensities can partly be explained by
differences in attitudes of the caseworkers in different employment offices.
Apart from the policy style, the allocation intensity is likely to depend upon
regional labor market characteristics reflecting differences in labor demand and
supply. To identify the policy style, we use the residual variation after controlling
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both for individual characteristics of the unemployed and the aforementioned
regional covariates. Specifically, the latter comprise the characteristics of the
stock of unemployed in a region, the number of vacancies for full time jobs,
the share of foreigners among the unemployed, and the industry structure of
employment in the region.
We implement our IV approach in two steps analogous to Procedure 21.1 in
Wooldridge (2010, p. 939). In the first step, we allow for a full interaction of the
regional policy style with all covariates considered. For each region, we estimate
a separate linear probability model (the point estimates are robust to estimating
a probit model) for the dummy variable voucher award to individual i in month
m
Dim = α0,r +X
′
irm · αmr + vim, (1)
where Xirm involves regional and individual covariates and r (with r = 1, ..., 181)
refers to the region of individual i. Based on these estimates, we calculate the
predicted probabilities pˆim = αˆ0,r +X
′
irm · αˆmr for a voucher award. These proba-
bilities reflect differences across regions in the labor market conditions and across
individuals with different labor market outcomes, both of which we do not want
to use as exogenous variation in voucher awards. As instruments, we only use
the residual differences, which we allow to differ by individual characteristics and
which we attribute to exogenous differences in the policy style.
In the second stage, we run IV regressions, which are pooled across regions,
using pˆim as the conditionally exogenous instrument while controlling in the out-
come equation (the second stage of IV for employment or earnings outcomes)
for differences across regions in the labor market conditions as in the first stage
of the Wooldridge Procedure. Thus, we do not exclude regional supply and de-
mand effects and individual characteristics of the unemployed from the outcome
regressions. Correspondingly, the conditional variation in pˆim given all other re-
gressors used in the outcome regressions presumably reflects the aforementioned
heterogeneous differences in the policy style across regions.
Table 6 provides the F-statistics for the significance of the single instrument
pˆim in the first stage of the IV regressions for month m based on clustered boot-
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strap standard errors. These F-statistics lie above 1000 and for the most part
above 2000; thus, in a formal sense, the instruments are very strong for the sec-
ond stage. However, our instruments are based on region-specific estimates of the
variations in voucher awards, and we also report adjusted F-statistics, for which
we divide the aforementioned F-statistics by the number of regions minus one.
We think these adjusted F-statistics provide a better assessment of the bite of
the instrument. The adjusted F-statistics are larger than 10 (the typical rule-of-
thumb threshold in the literature) in 10 out of 12 months. Nevertheless, our IV
estimates of the treatment effects at a monthly frequency (that is, the frequency
at which we report the OLS and IPW results in the main part of the paper) in-
volve a fairly large estimation error and are often not significant (these IV results
at the monthly frequency are not reported in the paper, and they are available
upon request). For these reasons, our sensitivity analysis only reports the IV and
OLS estimates averaged by the year since treatment; see Table 7.
The yearly IV employment (earnings) effects are significantly negative during
the first three (two) years. The treatment effects estimated by OLS and IV
(the second and third column) remain negative and insignificant in the case of
IV. The second-to-last column displays the difference between the descriptive
estimates and the OLS estimates. This difference is always significantly positive,
which is consistent with positive selection based on observables in all four years
as discussed in the main part of the paper. This is also the case for earnings. The
last column displays the difference between the IV estimates and OLS estimates.
The difference is consistently negative, though never significantly so. In addition,
the joint test of equality between OLS and IV (reported at the bottom of Table
7) during years 1 to 4 and during years 2 to 4 never exhibit significant differences.
Thus, for yearly treatment effects, there are no significant differences between the
OLS and the IV estimates.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings averaged over
elapsed unemployment durations until treatment.
Diamonds indicate significant effects.
Figure 2: Fraction of individuals in training after the award of a voucher.
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Figure 3: Comparison of average employment and average earnings between treat-
ment and matched control group averaged over elapsed unemployment durations
until treatment.
Figure 4: Heterogeneous effects on employment and earnings by skill group (OLS)
averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until treatment.
Figure 5: Comparison of average employment of treated and matched control
group by skill group averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until treat-
ment.
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Figure 6: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individuals
without vocational degree averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until
treatment.
Figure 7: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individu-
als with vocational degree averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until
treatment.
Figure 8: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individu-
als with academic degree averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until
treatment.
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Figure 9: Heterogeneous effects on employment and earnings with regard to the
type of training (OLS) averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until treat-
ment
Figure 10: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individuals
participating in long-term courses averaged over elapsed unemployment durations
until treatment.
Figure 11: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individuals
participating in degree courses averaged over elapsed unemployment durations
until treatment.
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Figure 12: Comparison of average employment of treated and matched control
group by course type averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until treat-
ment.
Figure 13: Heterogeneous effects on employment and earnings with regard to the
type of training and vocational degree (OLS) averaged over elapsed unemploy-
ment durations until treatment
Figure 14: Heterogeneous effects on employment and earnings with regard to the
redemption decision (OLS) averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until
treatment.
41
Figure 15: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individuals
who redeem the voucher averaged over elapsed unemployment durations until
treatment.
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Figure 16: Effect of a voucher award on employment and earnings for individuals
who do not redeem the voucher averaged over elapsed unemployment durations
until treatment.
Figure 17: Regional Differences in Voucher Awards per Unemployed
Notes: Differences in unconditional award intensities across employment office dis-
tricts. Min= 0.08%, Max= 5.59%, Mean= 2.43%, Award Intensity = #Voucher Re-
cipients/#Unemployed by District.
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Table 1: Means and Standardized Differences (SD) for Personal Characteristics
Treatment- Control- SD before Matched SD after Voucher Voucher Degree Long-term
group group Matching Controlgroup Matching redeemed expired Courses Courses
Female 0.446 0.431 6.630 0.445 0.180 0.446 0.445 0.490 0.416
Age
25-29 years 0.156 0.155 1.530 0.158 0.430 0.154 0.166 0.234 0.126
30-34 years 0.189 0.176 3.540 0.1900 0.170 0.189 0.193 0.250 0.171
35-39 years 0.233 0.205 6.700 0.233 0.190 0.234 0.226 0.245 0.229
45-49 years 0.142 0.155 3.860 0.141 0.220 0.143 0.139 0.074 0.165
50-54 years 0.071 0.115 15.340 0.070 0.180 0.070 0.074 0.015 0.088
Nationality
Germany 0.928 0.906 8.000 0.929 0.200 0.930 0.923 0.910 0.938
Outside EU 0.031 0.060 14.210 0.031 0.120 0.030 0.031 0.040 0.027
Missing 0.017 0.007 8.580 0.016 0.160 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.015
Marital Status
Single 0.322 0.310 3.810 0.323 0.260 .318 0.344 0.287 0.337
Single parent 0.071 0.058 5.150 0.071 0.150 .076 0.069 0.098 0.061
Married 0.462 0.484 4.590 0.462 0.120 .467 0.437 0.441 0.477
Missing 0.102 0.100 3.660 0.101 0.280 .100 0.107 0.125 0.082
Child 0.363 0.355 2.850 0.363 0.160 0.369 0.335 0.420 0.351
Age of youngest child
One year 0.012 0.011 1.980 0.012 0.090 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.011
Between 1 and 3 years 0.035 0.031 2.510 0.035 0.100 0.036 0.033 0.042 0.034
Between 3 and 6 years 0.065 0.061 2.160 0.065 0.130 0.066 0.059 0.085 0.061
Between 6 and 10 years 0.082 0.075 2.860 0.087 0.110 0.082 0.080 0.103 0.074
Older than 14 years 0.086 0.098 4.100 0.086 0.150 0.088 0.078 0.081 0.091
Missing 0.638 0.647 2.860 0.639 0.160 0.633 0.666 0.581 0.650
Disabled 0.020 0.026 3.980 0.020 0.150 0.019 0.026 0.007 0.024
Health
Health problems 0.094 0.120 8.330 0.094 0.220 0.092 0.107 0.081 0.096
Health problems 0.040 0.050 4.910 0.040 0.070 0.039 0.046 0.033 0.040
before unemployment
N 50,796 82,397 42,331 8,465 10,976 26,721
Omitted Categories:
Age: 40-44 years
Nationality: Member EU
Marital Status: Common law marriage
Age of youngest child: Between 10 and 14 years
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Table 2: Means and Standardized Differences (SD) for Education, Occupation,
and Sector
Treatment- Control- SD before Matched SD after Voucher Voucher Degree Long-term
group group Matching Controlgroup Matching redeemed expired Courses Courses
Education
No schooling degree 0.041 0.068 11.980 0.041 0.070 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.038
University entry degree 0.225 0.173 13.030 0.226 0.360 0.227 0.214 0.163 0.267
Missing 0.012 0.014 2.480 0.012 0.110 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.010
Vocational Training
No vocational degree 0.218 0.230 7.400 0.217 0.350 0.218 0.221 0.363 0.156
Academic degree 0.108 0.089 6.450 0.109 0.450 0.110 0.099 0.050 0.146
Missing 0.012 0.014 2.400 0.012 0.130 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.010
Classification of Occupation
Farmer, Fisher 0.013 0.024 8.310 0.013 0.190 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.012
Technical 0.077 0.054 9.370 0.078 0.170 0.078 0.074 0.024 0.105
Service 0.621 0.580 8.350 0.621 0.130 0.612 0.627 0.629 0.616
Other 0.004 0.005 3.420 0.004 0.190 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003
Part-time work
Full-time 0.804 0.789 8.140 0.805 0.270 0.805 0.801 0.773 0.832
Missing 0.071 0.081 3.930 0.071 0.290 0.070 0.076 0.082 0.061
Part-time work desired
Desired 0.830 0.823 4.480 0.830 0.230 0.831 0.825 0.821 0.850
Missing 0.085 0.085 4.270 0.085 0.310 0.084 0.088 0.108 0.065
Type of work
White-collar 0.475 0.381 19.030 0.476 0.210 0.474 0.479 0.335 0.536
Missing 0.106 0.109 6.660 0.106 0.140 0.108 0.096 0.133 0.091
Azubi 0.029 0.018 11.880 0.029 0.310 0.031 0.021 0.049 0.012
Sector
Agriculture 0.009 0.015 5.890 0.009 0.110 0.009 0.008 .011 .008
Mining 0.002 0.002 1.210 0.002 0.090 0.002 0.001 .002 .002
Utilities 0.002 0.002 1.140 0.002 0.110 0.002 0.002 .001 .002
Construction 0.068 0.100 11.450 0.068 0.150 0.068 0.067 .056 .074
Trade 0.150 0.132 5.170 0.150 0.140 0.149 0.155 .140 .153
Hotels and Restaurants 0.028 0.038 5.120 0.028 0.120 0.028 0.033 .038 .024
Traffic, Transportation 0.054 0.056 1.470 0.053 0.160 0.054 0.054 .065 .051
Financial Services 0.020 0.013 5.180 0.019 0.140 0.020 0.018 .015 .022
Renting 0.010 0.010 1.290 0.010 0.070 0.010 0.010 .006 .012
Data processing 0.144 0.118 7.770 0.143 0.240 0.143 0.147 .093 .170
Public Sector, Education 0.056 0.062 4.680 0.056 0.240 0.055 0.057 .059 .057
Health and social services 0.074 0.072 14.600 0.074 0.280 0.075 0.067 .137 .042
Other Services 0.040 0.042 2.240 0.040 0.130 0.041 0.038 .049 .038
Temporary Employment 0.133 0.171 12.690 0.134 0.360 0.132 0.136 .142 .129
N 50,796 82,397 42,331 8,465 10,976 26,721
Omitted Categories:
Education: Schooling degree without Abitur
Vocational Training: Vocational Degree
Classification of Occupation: Miner and Manufacturing
Part-time work: Part-time
Part-time work desired: Not desired
Type of work: Blue-collar
Sector: Production
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Table 3: Means and Standardized Differences (SD) for Employ-
ment/Unemployment/ALMP History
Treatment- Control- SD before Matched SD after Voucher Voucher Degree Long-term
group group Matching Controlgroup Matching redeemed expired Courses Courses
Noticeable problems
Problem group 0.018 0.025 4.790 0.018 0.180 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.020
Sanction 0.011 0.031 14.010 0.011 0.110 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.008
Lack of Motivation 0.108 0.134 9.160 0.108 0.110 0.106 0.116 0.133 0.095
Incapacity 0.136 0.213 21.000 0.136 0.250 0.128 0.180 0.124 0.129
Dropout 0.012 0.054 23.650 0.012 0.210 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.010
Employment History (last 7 years), Sequences (1 for employed, 0 for unemployed)
Mostly employed in last period (i.e., 1111000, 1101000, 1000101)
Mostly unemployed (i.e., 1000010) 0.170 0.223 13.180 0.171 0.290 0.170 0.173 0.228 0.150
3 years employed, close (i.e., 1111010) 0.131 0.095 11.280 0.131 0.100 0.131 0.132 0.135 0.127
3 years employed, far (i.e., 1100111) 0.026 0.055 14.690 0.026 0.190 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.027
3 years unemployed, close (i.e., 1000011) 0.012 0.025 9.969 0.012 0.120 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012
3 years unemployed, far (i.e., 1101000) 0.099 0.088 3.640 0.099 0.210 0.099 0.095 0.112 0.095
Mixed employment (i.e., 1101101) 0.049 0.061 5.430 0.049 0.170 0.049 0.049 0.053 0.047
Mostly unemployed in last period (i.e., 0111000, 0101000, 0000101)
Mostly employed (i.e., 0101101) 0.014 0.030 10.650 0.014 0.090 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015
3 years employed, close (i.e., 0111001) 0.004 0.006 2.640 0.004 0.080 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004
3 years employed, far (i.e., 0100111) 0.001 0.004 5.570 0.001 0.110 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Program History (last 3 years), Sequences
Often in programs 0.012 0.034 14.970 0.012 0.260 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.012
No programs 0.911 0.774 38.420 0.910 0.380 0.911 0.910 0.907 0.911
History of Wages While Employed (measured as average daily wages)
Real wage (t-1) 67.435 58.960 27.860 67.501 0.200 67.354 67.889 58.196 71.637
Real wage (t-2) 61.086 48.079 36.580 61.169 0.220 60.979 61.665 50.649 65.550
Real wage (t-3) 54.875 44.204 27.780 54.815 0.200 54.835 55.120 44.087 59.399
Real wage (t-4) 49.820 43.230 16.930 49.679 0.350 49.700 50.493 39.210 54.133
Real wage (t-5) 45.191 40.172 12.790 45.090 0.250 45.137 45.514 34.742 49.441
Real wage (t-6) 41.583 37.529 11.290 41.503 0.210 41.497 42.045 31.417 45.675
Real wage (t-7) 39.530 36.242 10.120 39.453 0.200 39.378 40.346 29.289 43.470
N 50,796 82,397 42,331 8,465 10,976 26,721
Omitted Categories:
Mostly employed in last Period: Mostly Employed
Mostly unemployed in last period: 3 years unemployed (far) and Mixed Employment
History of programs (last 3 years): Seldom in programs
Table 4: Means and Standardized Differences (SD) for Regional Characteristics
Treatment- Control- SMD before Matched SMD after Voucher Voucher Degree Long-term
group group Matching Controlgroup Matching redeemed expired Courses Courses
Unemployment and Population
Unemployment rate ´ 12.195 12.842 12.31 12.221 0.504 12.255 11.907 12.745 12.430
Share of male unemployed 0.565 0.561 10.332 0.565 0.292 0.564 0.568 0.563 0.565
Share of German unemployed 0.858 0.871 14.674 0.858 0.437 0.859 0.851 0.868 0.857
Share of vacant fulltime jobs 0.794 0.789 6.586 0.794 0.196 0.794 0.795 0.790 0.793
Population per km2 590.595 560.973 3.850 591.575 0.179 566.358 714.376 532.299 632.596
Industries
Management of forests and agriculture 0.012 0.013 16.829 0.012 0.515 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012
Fishing 0.005 0.005 4.070 0.005 0.161 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Mining 0.010 0.010 3.477 0.010 0.240 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Energy and water supply 0.064 0.067 14.450 0.064 0.428 0.064 0.062 0.066 0.064
Construction 0.150 0.150 2.693 0.150 0.127 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.150
Trade 0.028 0.028 3.265 0.028 0.224 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028
Hotels and Restaurants 0.056 0.057 9.124 0.056 0.403 0.056 0.055 0.057 0.056
Transport and Communications 0.038 0.037 7.663 0.038 0.249 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.038
Bank and insurance business 0.118 0.116 5.452 0.118 0.215 0.117 0.120 0.116 0.120
Real estate activities 0.065 0.067 12.416 0.065 0.265 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.065
Public administration and defense 0.040 0.043 12.124 0.041 0.518 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.041
Education 0.118 0.117 3.118 0.118 0.125 0.117 0.118 0.118 0.118
Healthcare and social sector 0.047 0.047 3.795 0.047 0.207 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.048
Services 0.001 0.001 13.367 0.001 0.507 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Production at the household level 0.001 0.001 2.630 0.001 0.324 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Extraterritorial organizations and bodies 0.000 0.000 5.766 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other 0.000 0.000 8.644 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 50,796 82,397 42,331 8,465 10,976 26,721
Omitted Categories:
Industries: Manufacturing industry
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Table 5: Balancing Test (Smith and Todd, 2005)
Elapsed Unempl. Weighted Treated Number of # sign.
Duration (in months) Obs Parameters
1 2,151,575 8,419 106 9
2 2,037,131 4,497 106 4
3 1,861,567 4,721 106 7
4 1,707,959 4,664 106 6
5 1,586,653 4,554 106 7
6 1,491,415 4,355 106 5
7 1,403,392 4,131 106 9
8 1,332,685 3,873 106 6
9 1,266,373 3,509 106 10
10 1,204,959 3,241 106 4
11 1,151,255 2,718 106 5
12 1,097,295 2,114 106 2
1,272 74
Table 6: F-statistics for Instrument in First Stage
Elapsed unemployment duration (in months)
1 2 3 4 5 6
F-statistic 2762.82 1077.72 2053.54 2088.80 2486.04 2442.94
Adj. F-statistic 15.35 5.99 11.41 11.60 13.81 13.57
No. Treated 8,419 4,497 4,721 4,664 4,554 4,355
No. Wght. Obs 2,151,575 2,037,131 1,861,567 1,707,959 1,586,653 1,491,415
Elapsed unemployment duration (in months)
7 8 9 10 11 12
F-statistic 2134.11 2891.15 3178.19 3163.80 3242.71 2657.31
Adj. F-statistic 11.86 16.06 17.66 17.58 18.02 14.76
No. Treated 4,131 3,873 3,509 3,241 2,718 2,114
No. Wght. Obs 1,403,392 1,332,685 1,266,373 1,204,959 1,151,255 1,097,295
The F-statistic refers to the test of the significance of the fitted treatment probability in the first
stage of the IV estimates. The adjusted F-statistic is the F-statistics divided by 180 (number
of employment offices minus one).
Table 7: Yearly Treatment Effects
Desc. Difference OLS IV Desc. Diff - OLS Diff. IV-OLS
Effects on Employment Probability
year 1 -0.085 (0.001) -0.097 (0.002) -0.145 (0.037) 0.012 (0.001) -0.048 (0.037)
year 2 -0.087 (0.003) -0.126 (0.003) -0.180 (0.057) 0.039 (0.001) -0.055 (0.057)
year 3 -0.031 (0.003) -0.078 (0.003) -0.147 (0.058) 0.047 (0.002) -0.069 (0.058)
year 4 0.038 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003) -0.087 (0.060) 0.049 (0.002) -0.075 (0.060)
Effects on Monthly Earnings
year 1 -164.72 (3.55) -220.20 (3.93) -389.59 (128.11) 55.48 (2.39) -169.38 (127.33)
year 2 -97.72 (5.76) -247.55 (5.76) -280.84 (122.95) 149.83 (3.98) -33.29 (122.63)
year 3 8.82 (6.07) -169.92 (6.08) -202.20 (133.58) 178.75 (4.27) -32.28 (133.54)
year 4 132.26 (6.22) -58.48 (6.22) -89.48 (138.21) 190.75 (4.38) -31.00 (138.15)
Bold font indicates significance at 5% level. Wald test statistics for the joint significance of the
difference between IV and OLS over several years imply for employment a p-value = 0.558 over
years 1 to 4 and a p-value = 0.562 over years 2 to 4 and for earnings a p-value = 0.661 over
years 1 to 4 and a p-value = 0.989 over years 2 to 4.
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